Internal documents show how a source ended up in jail — and the fallout in the newsroom.
The documents fall short of revealing a conspiratorial cover-up. Instead they show an extreme version of the human errors, hubris and mismanagement familiar to anyone who has worked in a newsroom — and the struggle of The Intercept to live up to its lofty founding ideals in dealing with its own errors.
In 2013, for example, a Boeing engineer suggested installing a computer-based airspeed indicator to supplement the 737 max’s single external speed sensor, the faulty operation of which is suspected of triggering the mcas in the two deadly crashes: Lion Air Flight 610, on October 29, 2018, and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302, on March 10, 2019. The engineer’s request “was rejected by Boeing management due to cost concerns and because adding synthetic airspeed could have jeopardized the 737 MAX program’s directive to avoid pilot simulator training requirements,” the report says. If Boeing had told airlines that their pilots would need extensive retraining to fly the new planes, including instruction on how to react to an activation of the mcas, the airlines might have been less eager to order them. Not only did Boeing neglect to inform the airlines about the new feature, but it removed any references to the mcas from the operations manual that pilots of the 737 max relied on.